






Abstract: Patents di®er from other forms of intellectual property in that inde-
pendent invention is not a defense to infringement. We argue that the patent rule is
inferior in any industry where the cost of independently inventing a product is not too
much less than (no less than half) the inventor's cost. First, the threat of entry by
independent invention would induce patentholders to license the technology, lowering
the market price. Second, a defense of independent invention would reduce the waste-
ful duplication of R&D e®ort that occurs in patent races. In either case, the threat of
independent invention creates a mechanism that limits patentholders' pro¯ts to levels
commensurate with their costs of R&D.
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11 Independent Invention
Perhaps the most basic di®erence between patents and other intellectual property
like trade secrets and copyright is that independent invention is not a defense to in-
fringement. If a ¯rm inadvertently re-invents a patented technology, even an innocent
attempt to market the product subjects the ¯rm to damages and injunctions. This
is not true of other forms of intellectual property, in which independent invention is
either a recognized defense (e.g. trade secrets) or not protected against in the ¯rst
place (e.g. copyright). It is hard to see how the two rules could simultaneously be
optimal. In this paper we discuss industrial environments where the best rule is to
allow a defense of independent invention. There are also circumstances in which the
anomalous rule for patent cases may be superior, but those circumstances do not nec-
essarily mirror legal doctrine; that is, they are not con¯ned to intellectual property
that is covered by patents.
Our argument has two prongs. One relates to how the market operates after a
patent has issued, and the other relates to the race that leads to the patent. Re-
garding the ex post market, we argue that the threat of independent invention curbs
market power without threatening the patentholder's ability to cover his R&D costs.
Regarding the race, we argue that the defense of independent invention reduces waste.
Our argument is premised on the observation that, even if independent invention
is legal, R&D costs will not necessarily be duplicated in equilibrium. Independent
invention will be frequently threatened and rarely carried out. The patentholder will
avoid duplication through licensing. The patentholder has an incentive to license on
terms that commit to a low price, so that other potential duplicators are deterred.
Such pro¯t-eroding licensing is the patentholder's best option when he is threatened
by duplication, and this is where the social bene¯t lies. Whether the patentholder
can nevertheless cover his R&D cost depends on the cost of duplication. Lower costs
of duplication will lead to a more generous licensing policy, and less pro¯t for the
1patentholder. However in the (standard) model we present, the duplicator's costs can
be as little as half those of the patentholder, without jeopardizing the patentholder's
incentives to innovate.
Our scheme thus addresses an important criticism of the existing patent system,
namely, that the market power conferred by a patent does not take account of the
R&D cost. Under the current system, if the value of the invention is very large
relative to R&D cost, then the inventor may be overrewarded, and deadweight loss
may be unnecessarily high. But if independent invention is a defense to infringement,
the patentholder limits his own market power by allowing entry. Provided the cost of
independent invention is not too much lower than the original cost of invention, the
prospect of allowing entry will not undermine his own incentives to invent.
The race leading up to the patent is another matter. The race might lead to
duplicated R&D costs with or without the threat of independent invention. However
we argue that the problem is mitigated by a defense of independent invention.
The same analysis can be interpreted for \inventing around" a patent. Whether an
entrant enters by independently inventing a close substitute or by avoiding the patent
in his production process, his incentive to enter, and his impact on the patentholder's
pro¯t, depend only on the cost of entry. If breadth is related to the costs of entry,
then \breadth" requirement for patents serves the same role as the \independence" re-
quirement for trade secrets and copyrights, and similar economic analysis applies. We
apply our arguments to this interpretation, and, in doing so, address a disagreement
between Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Gallini (1992).
In the next section we illuminate the patentholder's ex post incentive to commit to
lower prices through licensing, in order to avoid duplication.4 In Section 3, we show
4Many legal scholars have been less optimistic than economists about whether ¯rms will license
to avoid waste. E.g., see Adelman (1977) who thinks not, and suggests that rights should re°ect
this problem. In contrast, Lichtman (1997) makes an argument in the spirit of our own paper, but
for unpatentable goods. His model is most easily interpreted as one in which entrants serve di®erent
2how the threat of duplication a®ects patent races. Part of this argument is similar to
that of La Manna, MacLeod and de Meza (1989), although they did not discuss the
independent invention defense. In Section 4 we point out that a suitable patent breadth
can lead to social bene¯ts similar to those engendered by the defense of independent
invention, and we resolve the previous dispute. In Section 5 we discuss the limitations
of our arguments, and the dangers inherent in making independent invention a defense.
In particular we address the feasibility of the independent invention defense for patents,
and point out circumstances where the defense would be hard to implement.
The innovation and licensing markets in this paper operate di®erently than those
of Gallini (1984) and Gallini and Winter (1985) because of the threat of entry. Those
papers focussed on cost-reducing innovations in two-¯rm markets with no threat of
additional entry. In this paper it is the continual threat of entry by as yet unidenti¯ed
entrants that induces the patentholder to commit to a lower market price through
licensing. With no threat of entry, the licensor would want to to keep price high
rather than low. The threat of entry gives the patentholder an incentive to limit
his own pro¯t in exactly those circumstances where pro¯t can be limited without
undermining the incentive to innovate.
2A M o d e l w i t h N o P a t e n t R a c e
First we assume that a single patent has issued, and show how the defense of indepen-
dent invention can motivate licensing in order to deter entry. Licensing reduces the
market price and bene¯ts consumers without jeopardizing the patentholder's ability
to recover R&D costs. In the next section, we introduce a patent race in the same
model.
T h em a r k e tg a m ea f t e ri s s u a n c eo ft h ep a t e n ti sa sf o l l o w s .Ap a t e n t h o l d e rh a sa
markets, since there are no price e®ects.
3proprietary product that can be independently duplicated at the cost KE.W e l e t
KP represent the cost that the patentholder himself invested in the innovation. If the
patentholder licenses the technology, he will license with a ¯xed fee and royalty, (F;½),
to the maximum number of ¯rms, n, that would ¯nd it pro¯table to enter on those
terms. The market price of the patented commodity will depend on the number of
licensees and their marginal costs of production, where \marginal cost" includes any
royalties they must pay. Since all ¯rms who enter the market, whether by license or
duplication, will have the same technology, their \marginal costs" of production will be
either c (for the patentholder and possibly an entrant who duplicates the technology)
or c+½ (for a licensee). There will be n market participants with \marginal cost" c+½
and k participants with marginal cost c. With no entrants, k = 1 (the patentholder),
a n dw i t he n t r y ,k = 2 (the patentholder plus entrant). In equilibrium, k =1 ,s i n c e
the licensing strategy will deter entry. Our objective is to characterize the licensing
strategy, n and (F;½), that maximizes pro¯t subject to deterring entry, and to show
that if demand is \large" relative to R&D costs, the patentholder will undermine his
own pro¯t by licensing to several ¯rms at a reasonable royalty rate, after which he
earns less than the monopoly pro¯t.
We let ¦P(n;½) represent the sum of licensees' and patentholder's pro¯t. We
assume that all the pro¯t ¦P(n;½) is collected by the patentholder through the ¯xed
fee F, and the licensees make zero pro¯t. It is optimal for the licensees to accept
such terms because, in equilibrium, the royalty rate will be chosen so that entry is
deterred. Assuming that there are an unlimited number of potential licensees and
entrants, a licensee cannot make positive pro¯t by refusing the license and duplicating
the invention. Another licensee would take his place, and then he would not ¯nd it
pro¯table to duplicate the invention and enter without a license. Thus the licensee
cannot do better than to accept the licensing terms that give him zero pro¯t.
Because of the threat of entry, the patentholder will not charge the monopoly price.
Instead he will use licensing to commit to a lower market price in order to deter entry.
4Of course licensing is only optimal if the costs of R&D (and costs of duplication) are
relatively low; otherwise entry is not a threat, and, indeed, the patentholder might
need the whole monopoly pro¯t to cover his R&D costs. But when the R&D costs
(and costs of duplication) are low, the threat of entry can improve consumer welfare
without reducing incentives to innovate.
We now make the described model more speci¯c by assuming a linear demand
curve and Cournot competition. Suppose the inverse demand function is given by the
function q 7! a¡q; a > 0, and the marginal cost of production is c; c < a.I nC o u r n o t
equilibrium, qL(n;½;k)a n dqC(n;½;k) are respectively the quantities supplied by each
l i c e n s e d¯ r ma n de a c hu n l i c e n s e d¯ r m .T h e ys o l v e :
q
L(n;½;k)=a r g m a x
q [a ¡ ((n ¡ 1)q
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5We now consider the pro¯tability of entry. Let ¦E(n;½) designate the pro¯t of an
entrant into a market with n licensees paying royalty ½.T h ev a l u eo f¦ E(n;½)b e l o w
re°ects the assumption that subsequent to entry the ¯rms achieve a Cournot equilib-
rium with one additional unlicensed ¯rm.
¦
E(n;½)= [ p(n;½;2) ¡ c] q
C(n;½;2) =
1
(n +3 ) 2 (a ¡ c + n½)
2 (2)
Lemma 1 If the patentholder licenses his technology, the optimal royalty rate satis¯es
½<a¡c
3 .
Proof: We consider two cases, KE > 1
9 (a ¡ c)2 and KE · 1
9 (a ¡ c)2. In the ¯rst
case, where the duplication costs are relatively high, the patentholder will not license.
If an entrant competes with the patentholder in the absence of licensees, each ¯rm
earns the duopoly pro¯t (a ¡ c ¡ 2qC(0;0;2))qC(0;0;2) = 1
9 (a ¡ c)2. No licensees
are needed in order to deter entry. Consider the second case. The expression for
qL(n;½;k) shows that licensees will not produce in equilibrium unless the royalty rate
satis¯es ½<(a ¡ c)=(k + 1). To help deter entry, the licensees must be willing to
supply a positive amount after entry, when k = 2. Otherwise the patentholder and
entrant would again earn duopoly pro¯ts 1
9 (a¡c)2, which would not deter entry. The
result follows. 2
In view of this lemma, let ¦Pand ¦E be de¯ned on the domain R+ £ [0;
a¡c
3 ]. On
this domain, ¦E(¢;½) is decreasing at each ¯xed ½,a n d¦ E(n;¢) is increasing at each
¯xed n. (At a ¯xed royalty, a potential entrant's pro¯t is a decreasing function of the
number of licensees. With a ¯xed number of licensees, the potential entrant's pro¯t
increases with the royalty.)
The arguments that now follow can most easily be understood if the reader refers
to Figure 1. The patentholder's pro¯t (the upper lines) and the pro¯t of a prospective
















7entrant (the lower lines) are graphed for n =1 ;2;3. As one can see, the patentholder's
pro¯t is approximately twice the entrant's pro¯t, for each (n;½): If the cost of entry
would be KE, as shown by the horizontal dotted line, then entry can be deterred with
n =2o rn = 3 licensees. With 2 licensees, the patentholder will increase the royalty
½ to the intersection of the dotted line with the line that represents ¦E(2;½).
In the following Lemma, Z+ represents the positive integers.
Lemma 2 For each KE; 0 <K E < 1
9(a ¡ c)2 there exists (n;½) 2 Z+£ [0; a¡c
3 ] such
that ¦E(n;½)=KE.
Proof: First observe that ¦E(¢;0) is decreasing and continuous in its argument
n 2 R+,a n dt h a t¦ E(¢;0) takes every value in (0; 1
9(a ¡ c)2) for some nonnegative
value n: Hence there exists n¤ 2 R+ that satis¯es ¦E(n¤;0) = KE.H o w e v e rn¤ might
not be an integer. Let ~ n be the smallest integer that is no smaller than n¤: It holds
that ~ n ¸ n¤; and typically ~ n>n ¤: Since KE < 1
9(a ¡ c)2, it follows that n¤ > 0a n d
~ n ¸ 1. Since ¦E(¢;0) is decreasing, ¦E(~ n;0) · KE. Using continuity of ¦E(~ n;¢), since
¦E(~ n;0) · KE =¦ E(n¤;0) < ¦E(~ n ¡ 1;0) · ¦E(~ n; ®¡c
3 ); there exists ½ 2 [0; a¡c
½ ]
such that ¦E(~ n;½)=KE: 2
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But since the righthand side expression is decreasing in n, this implies(taking the limit
as n !1 )t h a t
¦P(n;½)
¦E(n;½) > 2: 2
The following proposition is the main result on ex post licensing. It implies that if
the costs of duplication are more or less commensurate with the original innovator's
costs, KE = KP, then incentives to innovate are not threatened by the threat of
duplication. In fact the costs of duplication can be lower than the innovator's costs,
by as much as half.
Proposition 1 Let KE ¸ 1
2KP: Then there exists a licensing contract (n;½) such that
(i) entry by independent inventors is deterred, ¦E(n;½) · KE; and (ii) the innovator
covers his costs: ¦P(n;½) >K P:
Proof: Suppose ¯rst that KE >
(a¡c)2
9 : Then entry is deterred without licensing,
since the the duopoly pro¯ts will not cover the imitator's costs.
Therefore suppose that KE ·
(a¡c)2
9 : By Proposition 2, there exists a licensing
contract (n;½) such that KE =¦ E(n;½): Using Lemma 3, ¦P(n;½) > 2¦E(n;½)=
2KE >K P: 2
3 Patent Races
We now ask how the independent-invention rule a®ects a patent race. Suppose, ¯rst,
that the race is winner-take-all, as usually conceived. Then by the arguments above,
9the ex post value of the patent will be reduced by lenient license terms to a value close
to the cost of R&D. In anticipation of this, entry to the race will be limited, perhaps
to one ¯rm. Thus, the threat of independent invention might substantially reduce the
cost duplication in a race.
However the defense of independent invention might alternatively support the view
that the ¯rms in the race are independent inventors (none learned the technology from
another ¯rm), so that each successful ¯rm can enter the market at the end of the race.
This scenario is similar to the permissive-patents regime suggested by La Manna,
MacLeod and de Meza (1989). The ¯rms in the race will become market competitors,
just as if they had been racing for a trade secret rather than a patent.5
Our conclusion below is that the threat of ex post competition will deter some ¯rms
from entering the race. The ex post competition reduces the market price, and the ex
ante reluctance to race reduces the duplication of R&D costs. Both e®ects improve
social welfare.
We will use the notation ¦o(k) for per-¯rm pro¯t in an oligopoly with k ¯rms. The
total pro¯t available to k ¯rms competing in the market is k¦o(k). Our argument
depends only on the fact that, with constant marginal costs of production, k¦o(k)i s
less than the monopoly pro¯t ¦o(1) (else the monopolist would choose the oligopolists'
price). Although nothing in the argument depends on the speci¯cs of the above model,
the value of ¦o(k)i nt h ea b o v em o d e li s
¦
o(k)=[ a ¡ kq
C(0;0;k) ¡ c] q
C(0;0;k)=
1
(k +1 ) 2(a ¡ c)
2
We assume that several ¯rms can simultaneously invest the R&D cost KP in pursuit
of the patent. Under the current rule, where independent invention is not a defense,
5It does not matter whether all the ¯rms in the race receive patents, or whether the ¯rst inventor
receives the patent, and the other independent inventors only receive a defense against infringement.
In both cases, enough ¯rms will race so that there is no temptation to duplicate after the patent
issues.
10one patent will issue, and only one ¯rm will be authorized to sell in the market. If
there are k ¯rms in a race, each wins the patent with probability 1
k, so the expected
value of entering the race is 1
k¦o(1) ¡ KP. The total amount invested in the race is
kKP,o fw h i c h( k ¡ 1)KP is unnecessary cost duplication. The following proposition
says that the independent-invention rule can reduce the cost duplication.
Proposition 2 Assume that marginal costs of production are constant, so that total
pro¯t of ¯rms in an oligopoly with k>1 ¯rms is less than in a monopoly, i.e., k¦o(k) <
¦o(1). Under the rule that independent invention is a defense to infringement, there
is less (no greater) duplication of costs in a patent race than with the alternative rule,
where only one ¯rm can enter the market ex post, and is immune from duplication.
Proof: If independent invention is not a defense, then the number of ¯rms ¹ k in the
race solves ¦o(1)=¹ k ¸ KP > ¦o(1)=(¹ k + 1). This means that each ¯rm in the race
makes nonnegative expected pro¯t, and the ¯rms would make negative expected pro¯t
if another entered the race. If independent invention is a defense, then the number of
¯rms ~ k in the race solves ¦o(~ k) ¸ KP > ¦o(~ k+1): Thus, ¦o(1)=(¹ k+1) <K P · ¦o(~ k);
so ¦o(1) < (¹ k +1 ) ¦ o(~ k). But then ~ k¦o(~ k) < ¦o(1) < (¹ k +1 ) ¦ o(~ k); so ~ k<¹ k +1 ; or
~ k · ¹ k. 2
Even though the defense of independent invention can reduce the duplication of
R&D costs in a race, the wasteful duplication might not be eliminated entirely. There
will be enough ¯rms in the market ex post so that no licensing is required to deter
further duplication. This is because an ex post entrant would earn ¦o(~ k+1)¡KP < 0:
Nevertheless, the patent race itself remains wasteful. If there were a ¯xed number
of potential entrants to the race, the identi¯ed potential entrants could form a joint
venture to eliminate the duplication, sharing the ex post pro¯t. However the assump-
tion of unlimited potential entrants makes this impossible, since there will always be
another potential entrant ready to race against the joint venture.
114 Patent Breadth as a Policy Instrument
Even though there is currently no defense of independent invention, ¯rms can still \du-
plicate" inventions by inventing around existing patents. To invent around a patent,
the imitator must make sure his imitation falls outside the patent's breadth.6 There
is no concept of breadth for either trade secrets or copyrights, and consequently there
is no defense of \independence" if the imitator had access to the invention. Patents
automatically give access through disclosure, and that is why a certain amount of
breadth is a necessary feature of patent protection.
Exactly as in the story above, a patentholder will have incentive to license potential
entrants in order to avoid the costs that might be wasted in inventing around a patent.
He thus makes the best of a bad prospect. This leads to the social bene¯ts described
above, namely, that the patentholder will give terms that reduce the market price in
order to deter entry. As long as the cost of duplication is high enough, the patentholder
will nevertheless cover his costs.
In this interpretation, our arguments shed light on optimal patent breadth, and in
particular on a disagreement between Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Gallini (1992).
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) interpret patent breadth as a constraint on how high a
monopolist can raise price, holding the market demand ¯xed. This is unsatisfactory
because there is no legal interpretation under which narrowing patent breadth would
have the e®ect of lowering price while keeping the demand ¯xed.7 Am o r ec o n v i n c i n g
notion of breadth was given by Gallini (1992), who interpreted breadth as the amount
of investment required to invent around the patent. Given a ¯xed term of protection,
6Patent breadth governs other economic functions as well as limiting horizontal entry. See, e.g.,
Klemperer (1990), where breadth used to de¯ne distance between protected and imitation products
in quality space; Green and Scotchmer (1995) and O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998), where
breadth determines whether a new product infringes an old patent in the context of cumulative
innovation, and Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), who show in such a model that it might be optimal
to di®erentiate patent breadths by endogenous choice.
7The authors refer to compulsory licensing, but that is a weak argument, since the U.S. has no
such thing, and in any case, it is not the same as patent breadth.
12a narrow enough patent encourages entry, reduces the market price, and erodes the
patentholder's pro¯t. It is thus an interpretation under which narrower breadth has an
impact on price without changing demand. Gallini concludes, however, that patents
should be broad enough to prevent entry, as the duplication of costs required for entry
is socially wasteful.
These two papers reach opposite conclusions about whether patents should be
long and narrow or short and broad. Gilbert and Shapiro are concerned only with
minimizing discounted deadweight loss, and conclude that patents should be long and
narrow. However Gallini is concerned with minimizing deadweight loss plus wasteful
expenditures. The goal of avoiding waste leads her to conclude that patents should
short and broad (just long enough so the patentholder covers his costs, and broad
enough to deter entry).
We disagree with both these analyses. The Gilbert and Shapiro analysis does not
have a mechanism by which breadth a®ects price, and the Gallini analysis does not
hold if patentholder and potential entrants do what is rational, namely, license to avoid
waste. In fact, using the Gallini de¯nition of breadth, the analysis above can be used
to restore the Gilbert and Shapiro analysis. A narrower patent (lower costs of entry)
encourages licensing on terms that lead to a lower market price without duplicative
waste. Thus, breadth is monotonically related to price, as assumed by Gilbert and
Shapiro. Since there is no duplicative waste in equilibrium, their type of analysis is
restored.
Of course the limitations of the Gilbert and Shapiro treatment remain. Whether
long, narrow patents are superior to short, broad patents depends on market consider-
ations such as the shape of the demand curve. Further, Gilbert and Shapiro implicitly
impose a regulatory burden to regulate the monopolist's price according to his R&D
costs. Similarly, the interpretation here imposes a burden to tailor patent breadth to
R&D costs. These burdens would be largely avoided by forcing a lower price through
the independent-invention defense.
135R o b u s t n e s s
We now address some of the limitations and dangers inherent in the independent-
invention defense.
Would Independent Inventors Have a Signi¯cant Cost Advantage?
Our argument works if the cost of duplication is not much lower than the paten-
tholder's R&D cost of invention. (Some discrepancy can be tolerated; see Figure 1.)
There are two basic reasons that the costs of duplication can be lower. First, merely
knowing that someone has invented a product can be important for expected costs of
duplication in cases where signi¯cant ex ante doubts exist about whether the proposed
product can be made at all. (The atomic bomb is a particularly notorious example.)
Second, competitors can cheat by claiming that they independently invented what
they surreptitiously copied. We discuss the ¯rst possibility here and address cheating
in the next subpart.
Pharmaceuticals are probably the best example of an industry with signi¯cant ex
ante uncertainty about success. The probability of achieving a marketable, FDA-
approved drug is about 1/5, conditional on having sunk the development costs. If the
cost of every pharmaceutical that comes to market is $.2b, ¯rms must anticipate $1b
in revenues in order to cover costs on average. The e®ective cost of each new drug
is therefore $1b, since this is the minimum compensation needed to induce ¯rms to
invest. On the other hand, an independent invention defense could let imitators avoid
\dry holes" and cut their R&D costs by 80%. In such a case, the threat of duplication
would undermine the patentholder's pro¯t to the point where he could no longer cover
his costs.
Pharmaceuticals are clearly important, but it is unclear how typical the phe-
nomenon is. In most industries, the question of whether a particular invention is
14possible given su±cient time and investment is never in doubt. (Automobiles, air-
planes, computer hardware, and software are good examples.) The real trick is to
avoid blind alleys so that the new product can be delivered on time and under budget.
Knowing that the original inventor has found a workable solution does little or noth-
ing to avoid these pitfalls. An independent invention defense therefore makes sense in
such industries.
There are various legal methods to distinguish these situations. For example, one
could imagine that in cases with signi¯cant ex ante uncertainty of success (e.g., phar-
maceuticals), judges would rule that independence is impossible. Hence the defense
would not apply. Imitators would have to invent around the patent. Our analysis sug-
gests that courts should set patent breadth so that the costs of imitation approximate
the original inventor's e®ective cost averaged over an appropriate number of dry holes.
Alternatively, one could imagine legislators enacting an independent invention de-
fense with listed exceptions for special-case industries like pharmaceuticals.8
Can independent inventors cheat?
Despite its theoretical advantages, an independent-invention defense could still
turn out to be unenforceable. This may explain why patent law has always lacked
such a defense, even though there is a such a defense in copyright and trade secrecy
law. Since patents are (by de¯nition) in the public domain, fraudulent claims of inde-
pendence may be undetectable. For copyright, illicit copying can usually be detected
by examining the infringing product itself, and for trade secrets, there is usually a
trail of wrongful acts that led to a breach of security.
It is possible that the historic justi¯cation no longer applies. Cheating of the
intentional variety can be controlled. Companies faced with potential intellectual
8This trend is growing. Special intellectual property legislation already exists for drugs, micro-
processor chips, and even boat hulls.
15property disputes routinely sequester their engineers in \clean rooms" before telling
them what to develop, especially when it comes to software, which is now patented as
well as copyrighted. Clean rooms can also be used to reduce the risks of unconscious
cheating, as when a software developer unconsciously appropriates knowledge that he
wishes he had not seen.
The risk of cheating is present in all legislation; the real question is whether the risk
is manageable. If clean rooms were the norm, ¯rms would have strong incentives to (a)
implement 'zero tolerance' precautions against conscious cheating, and (b) select and
isolate clean room personnel before unconscious cheating became a signi¯cant risk.
This is because they would know that even the tiniest irregularities could persuade a
jury to deprive them of their investment.
Does the form of competition matter?
So far, our arguments have assumed that ¯rms are Cournot competitors. As elab-
orated by Singh and Vives (1984), also HÄ ackner (2000), Bertrand competition and
Cournot competition generally lead to di®erent prices and pro¯ts. The authors con-
sider both substitutes and complements, but for our purposes, it is mainly substitutes
that matter, as complementary products would not generally infringe the original
patent, whether or not they were independently invented.
A key ¯nding is that, when the products are substitutes, Bertrand competition
reduces prices and pro¯ts. If the ¯rms anticipate Bertrand competition, entry will
more likely be deterred. In fact, entry may be so strongly deterred in the ¯rst case
we considered, where only one ¯rm would invest in the patent, that there is no reason
to license. The salutary e®ects of price reductions through licensing vanish. Paradox-
ically, the threat of a price war after entry will lead to higher prices in equilibrium
than under Cournot competition. With entry deterred by the threat of Bertrand
competition, the innovator could cover his costs with an even bigger cost discrepancy
than described in Proposition 1.
16However, independent invention still improves e±ciency for Bertrand competition
under our patent race model, at least in the case that all innovators can participate
in the market. Fewer ¯rms will race, and wasteful duplication will be reduced. Under
the alternative rule, where several ¯rms may race for the patent but only one patent
will issue, the form of ex post competition does not matter.
Are patent races bene¯cial?
A ¯nal reason for caution relates to an old ambiguity about the e±ciency of patent
races. Following, for example, Wright (1983), we have taken the view that patent
races permit an ine±cient duplication of costs and should be avoided. However other
authors (for example, Loury (1979)) take the view that patent races can be e±cient
because, although they increase R&D costs, they also accelerate innovation, which has
o®setting bene¯ts. The model here cannot address that view because the costs of R&D
are lump sum, and the timing of innovation is not at issue. If greater rewards lead to
faster invention, the existence of an independent-invention defense could ine±ciently
retard innovation by lowering the patentholder's pro¯t.
6 Conclusion
Our argument in favor of independent invention as a defense to infringement considers
two cases. First, the threat of duplication after the patent issues leads to lower market
price and less deadweight loss. Licensing will reduce market price in a way that bene¯ts
consumers without threatening the incentives to innovate. Since duplication will not
actually take place, the threat improves e±ciency.
Second, the independent-invention defense reduces entry into the race, and thus
reduces wasteful duplication. If the race is winner-take-all, as usually conceived under
existing law, then the prospect of having to license ex post in order to avoid duplica-
17tion will limit the number of ¯rms in the race. Under the alternative rule where all
successful ¯rms in a race can enter the market ex post,t h e nex post competition among
successful inventors will keep the consumer price lower than under the alternative rule,
where independent invention is not a defense. Both consequences { lower prices in the
market and less waste in a race { improve e±ciency without jeopardizing innovation.
With low costs of duplication, a very low market price is required to deter entry,
and the patentholder does not recover his R&D costs. This is why we require that the
entrant \duplicate" the invention rather than \copy" it. It is also why, in industrial
contexts where the imitator can avoid dry holes by observing what products were
successful, duplicated inventions should not be interpreted as \independent."
The assumption that the cost of imitation must be as high as the original R&D
costs can be somewhat relaxed, and therefore the theory can tolerate some imprecision
in the interpretation of independence. In equilibrium, the patentholder makes more
pro¯t than a duplicating ¯rm could make (see Figure 1), and the patentholder can
therefore recover costs while still deterring entry even if the duplicating ¯rm has some
cost advantage.
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